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Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of regulatory intervention to cut termination rates of 
calls from fixed lines to mobile phones. Under quite general conditions of 
competition, theory suggests that lower termination charges will result in higher 
prices for mobile subscribers, a phenomenon known as the “waterbed” effect. The 
waterbed effect has long been hypothesized as a feature of many two-sided markets 
and especially the mobile telephony industry. Using a uniquely constructed panel of 
mobile operators’ prices and profit margins across more than twenty countries over 
six years, we document empirically the existence and magnitude of this effect. Our 
results suggest that although regulation reduced termination rates by about 10%, this 
also led to a 5% increase in mobile retail prices. We also provide evidence that both 
competition and market saturation, and most importantly their interaction, affect the 
overall impact of the waterbed effect on prices. 
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1. Introduction 
It is well known that telecommunications networks interconnect in order to allow 
consumers of one network to be able to successfully complete a call to another 
consumer connected to a different network. What is perhaps less known is that there 
are considerable interconnection payments between networks that customers do not 
directly see but that have significant effects on the call prices they pay. The most 
important of these interconnection services is call termination. This allows a 
subscriber on one network to call a subscriber on another network. 
In this paper we focus on fixed-to-mobile termination rates (MTRs)4 that have 
become the regulators’ focus of concern worldwide in recent years. A large theoretical 
literature has demonstrated that, independently of the intensity of competition for 
mobile customers, mobile operators have an incentive to set MTRs that will extract 
the largest possible surplus from fixed users.5 To understand why, consider that 
mobile subscribers join just one network, and so callers on the fixed telephone 
network must route calls through a mobile subscriber’s chosen network. In other 
words, the receiving party chooses which mobile network to subscribe to, but the 
calling party (i.e., the fixed customer that originates the call) usually has no influence 
on this choice. The party that pays the termination charge (indirectly through retail 
prices) therefore has limited or no influence on the choice of network. This curbs 
considerably the downward pressure on MTRs. A mobile operator, even if competing 
against other mobile operators, holds a monopoly over delivering calls to its 
subscribers and will therefore set high MTRs. As a result, regulators are increasingly 
finding mobile operators to be dominant in setting MTRs. This has provided a 
rationale for imposing a remedy and cutting these rates. However, reducing the level 
of MTRs can potentially increase the level of prices for mobile subscribers, causing 
what is known as the “waterbed” effect. The main purpose of this paper is to examine 
the existence and magnitude of the waterbed effect in the mobile telephony industry. 
The idea behind the waterbed effect is intuitive. Each mobile customer makes, as 
well as receives, calls. As argued above, a mobile network is a “bottleneck” for 
received calls, and money can be made over their termination. Thus, each potential 
mobile customer comes with a “termination rent”, which leads mobile operators to 
                                                 
4 These are the charges mobile operators levy on fixed network operators for call termination. 
5 See, for example, Armstrong (2002), Wright (2002), and Valletti and Houpis (2005). Armstrong and 
Wright (2009) also provide an excellent overview of the mobile call termination theoretical literature 
and policy in the UK. Bomsel et al. (2003) estimate that, as a result of high MTRs, there has been a 
transfer of 19 billion euros from the fixed to the mobile sector over the period 1998-2002. The figure is 
calculated as the excess of termination charges paid over costs, in France, Germany and the UK alone. 
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compete for these customers, by offering them attractive deals. If regulation cuts this 
termination rent, then mobile operators may compete less aggressively and the bill 
paid by mobile customers will go up. 
Both regulators and academics have recognized the possibility that this effect 
might be at work. The first such debate started in 1997 in the UK with the original 
investigation by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (now Competition 
Commission). The Commission broadly endorsed the analysis of the UK 
telecommunications regulator, Oftel, that competition in the mobile industry did not 
constrain fixed-to-mobile termination charges and that a price cap was the only 
remedy likely to address these detriments effectively. The Commission considered 
that this would yield significant welfare gains without an increase in average retail 
mobile prices. In fact, it was during these investigations that the term “waterbed” was 
first coined by the late Prof. Paul Geroski, chairman of the Competition Commission. 
In 2005, the New Zealand Commerce Commission introduced similar regulation 
and while it was convinced that the waterbed effect is a theoretically general 
phenomenon, it doubted its empirical importance. Similarly, the most recent 
termination rate proposals by UK’s Ofcom (Oftel’s successor organization) 
acknowledged the importance of the waterbed effect, but questioned whether the 
effect is “complete”, in the sense that a reduction of, say, 1 euro in termination rents 
would push up the mobile bill also by 1 euro, arguing that this can only be the case if 
the retail market is sufficiently competitive.6 
Yet, despite the importance of the waterbed effect for welfare calculations, no 
systematic evidence is available on its existence or magnitude. Detecting this effect 
with casual empiricism is difficult. Anecdotal experience tells that both termination 
rates and mobile prices have come down over time. Does this imply there is no 
waterbed effect? Not necessarily, because the positive waterbed effect on subscription 
prices might have been compensated by a number of countervailing factors, such as 
tougher industry competition with additional firm entry, or technological reasons, 
such as technological progress or economies of scale due to growth in traffic volumes. 
In this paper we analyze the impact of MTR regulation on mobile prices and profit 
margins using a newly constructed dataset of mobile operators across more than 
twenty countries during the last decade. Our identification relies on the assumption 
that regulation influences retail prices only indirectly via reducing the termination 
rates and on the knowledge that regulators did not intervene in any other direct 
                                                 
6 See “Mobile call termination – Statement”, Ofcom, 2008. 
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manner on consumer prices. Using quarterly frequency data and employing panel data 
techniques that control for unobserved time-invariant country-operator characteristics 
and general time trends, we are able to quantify for the first time the waterbed effect.  
The timing of the introduction of regulated termination rates, but also the severity 
with which they were imposed across mobile firms, varied widely and has been driven 
by legal and institutional aspects of each country. This variability allows us to 
measure the impact on prices (and profits) through the MTR from countries that 
introduced this regulation compared to the general evolution of prices (and profits) in 
non-reforming countries. We also explicitly account for the possibility that regulatory 
intervention is the outcome of a bargaining (or lobbying) process between operators 
and the relevant authority by distinguishing between countries that introduced 
substantial cuts in MTRs and countries that regulated them but only mildly. 
Our results suggest that although regulation reduced MTRs by about ten percent, 
this also led to a 5% increase in mobile retail prices, varying between 2%-15% 
depending on the estimate. This roughly translates to a 25 euros (varying from 10 to 
82 euros) increase on the yearly bill per subscriber, or some 750 million euros (300 to 
2,400 million) extra in total in our sample. This waterbed effect is shown to be robust 
to different variable definitions, estimation methods and datasets. 
While the waterbed is shown to be high, our analysis provides evidence that it is 
not “complete”: accounting measures of profits are positively related to MTR. Mobile 
firms tend to keep part of termination rents instead of passing them on to their 
customers, and thus suffer from cuts in termination rates. Our empirical analysis also 
reveals that both competition and market saturation, and most importantly their 
interaction, affect the overall impact of the waterbed effect on prices: the waterbed 
effect is stronger the more intense competition is in markets with high levels of 
market penetration and high termination rates. In addition, we discuss how the 
waterbed effect has a differential impact on different customer types, namely those on 
pre-paid (pay-as-you-go) deals as opposed to those on post-paid contracts, in line with 
predictions from a recent literature on network interconnection. 
Our paper is related to an emerging literature on “two-sided” markets that studies 
how platforms set the structure of prices across the two sides of the business (see, e.g., 
Armstrong, 2006, Rochet and Tirole, 2006, and Nocke et al., 2007). 
Telecommunications networks are examples of two-sided markets: providing 
communication services to their own customers over the same platform and providing 
connectivity to their customer base to other networks. Whenever we look at two-sided 
4 
 
markets, the structure of prices (i.e., who pays for what) is important for the 
development of the market. In mobile telephony, network operators make money from 
different sources: from own customers making calls, and also from other people trying 
to contact own customers. Our work therefore also contributes to the more general 
understanding of two-sided markets. Recent empirical works on two-sided markets 
include Rysman (2004, on yellow pages; 2007, on credit cards), Argentesi and 
Filistrucchi (2007, on newspapers), and Kaiser and Wright (2006, on magazines). 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we summarize the theoretical 
predictions concerning the waterbed effect. Section 3 describes our empirical strategy 
and section 4 discusses the data used. Section 5 presents the main results. Section 6 
analyzes how the level of competition and market penetration interact with the 
magnitude of the waterbed effect, together with other extensions. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. The waterbed effect: theory 
Network interconnection occurs when two networks establish a link to allow 
customers of one network to communicate with customers of the other network. 
Imagine a customer of the fixed network F who wants to call a customer of the mobile 
operator M. This call, to be completed, uses network M as its termination segment. In 
all European countries, as in most of the world, there is a calling party pays system 
(CPP) in place.7 Under CPP, the service is initiated, and paid for, by the caller F to the 
mobile phone M, not by the mobile phone owner. Operator F thus needs to buy 
termination services from network operator M, which is the only operator which can 
sell the input necessary to complete the call. Therefore, the termination segment of the 
call (for which the MTR is paid) presents itself as an economic ‘bottleneck’ for the 
buying operator F.8 
The mobile customer cares most about the prices she has to pay to subscribe to 
and place calls with a mobile operator, but in most cases she will not take into account 
the prices paid by other callers to contact her. CPP is a source of distortion in this 
market, since it is the ‘wrong’ party that gets the full bill: the caller pays, but the 
                                                 
7 The U.S. is a noticeable exception in that there is a RPP (receiving party pays) system. For this 
reason, it is sometimes perceived that the termination problem does not exist in the U.S., where 
telecoms interconnection rates are very low. Actually, the U.S. is regulated too. Interconnection rates 
are so low, not because of market forces, but because of the intervention of the FCC (for instance, 
termination on a mobile network is regulated at the same long-run incremental cost of termination on 
an incumbent fixed network). This system has not changed over time. The U.S. also has a system of 
geographic numbers that does not allow to distinguish between calls terminated on fixed or mobile 
networks. For these reasons, the U.S. is not included in our sample. 
8 This term is used, more in general, in the literature on two-sided platforms (Armstrong, 2006). In the 
case of fixed-to-mobile calls, the fixed users do not have a choice of which mobile platform to join in 
order to reach a particular mobile user. Thus the mobile platform is a ‘bottleneck’ for these calls. 
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mobile network subscription is decided by somebody else. Once a person has decided 
to join a particular mobile operator M, that operator has a monopoly position over 
termination services from F to its subscribers. These services are paid for by other 
users subscribing to F, not by the subscribers of M themselves. 
This problem has been extensively analyzed in the literature, which has concluded 
that there is a need to regulate MTRs (Armstrong, 2002; Wright, 2002).9 In the next 
section we introduce a simple model that shows the implications of cutting MTRs. We 
show that lower MTRs result in higher bills to mobile customers (the “waterbed 
effect”). We also show how mobile retail prices are related crucially to termination 
rates, the intensity of competition, and the degree of market saturation of mobile 
phones in a given country. 
 
2.1 The waterbed effect for fixed-to-mobile calls 
In this section we discuss a logit model of demand that gives rise to the waterbed 
effect. Our intention is not to introduce a model for structural estimation, but rather to 
reassure that the waterbed effect is a common phenomenon under a wide range of 
market structures. There are N consumers, each of whom potentially subscribes to one 
of the n mobile operators or else chooses not to subscribe. The utility associate with 
non-purchase is denoted by V0. When V0 is very low, then the market is “covered” or 
“saturated” and every consumer subscribes to one operator. The utility from buying 
from firm i which sells a whole bundle of services at a total cost of Pi is: 
 
iii PUU µ+−= , 
 
where U is assumed to be identical across consumers and products, while µi is a 
random taste parameter which reflects the idiosyncrasies of individual tastes. This 
parameter is known to the consumer but is unobserved by the firms. 
The logit demand functions are obtained by assuming that all the µi are i.i.d. and 
follow the double exponential distribution with zero mean. As shown by Anderson et 
al. (1992), in this case the market share of firm i is the probability of a consumer 
choosing it and is given by: 
 
                                                 
9 Notice that most of the debate has evolved around the case of fixed-to-mobile calls for a good reason. 
The ‘other’ way of a communication, from the mobile network M to the incumbent fixed network F, 
has always been regulated in every country. The incumbent fixed network F has also an ‘obligation to 
interconnect’ and cannot refuse it. Therefore the fixed network F cannot be expected to exert 
countervailing buyer power when MTRs are set (see Binmore and Harbord, 2005, for a discussion). 
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where σ is a constant, which is related to the degree of product differentiation. It can 
be shown that when σ → 0 the variance of µi tends to zero. In this case, the 
multinomial logit reduces to a deterministic model. By contrast, when σ → ∞, the 
heterogeneity in tastes is also very large and the deterministic part of the utility, Ui, 
has no predictive power and consumers behave as if they were completely random. 
For ease of exposition, we assume that all calls made are to fixed users and all 
calls received are also from fixed users.10 Thus the profit of operator i is: 
 
 { {
rents
nterminatiobill
)( Iiiii TQNcP +−=Π α . 
The expression above shows that each mobile network operator derives revenues 
from two possible sources:  
• Services to own customers: these would include subscription services and 
outgoing calls. All these services are bundled together and cost c whereas the 
customer pays Pi, i.e., Pi is the total customer’s bill, while it is assumed that 
there are no other costs for terminating calls. 
• Incoming calls: these are calls received by own customers of firm i but made 
by customers of fixed networks. The total quantity of these calls to firm i is 
denoted by QIi and the corresponding price received by the mobile operator 
(the MTR) is denoted by T and is regulated.11 
 
We further assume that each fixed user calls each mobile user with the same per-
customer demand function qI(T). Therefore the total quantity of incoming calls to 
network i is )(TqNNQ IFiIi α= , where NF is the total number of fixed users. Then the 
profit function simplifies to: 
 
 NcP iii ατ )( +−=Π , 
 
                                                 
10 Calls to/from other mobile users could be easily accommodated in this framework, see Calzada and 
Valletti (2008). In section 6.2 we discuss the implications of this extension. 
11 Under regulation, T and the corresponding rent are determined by the Regulator in each country. If 
left unregulated instead, firms would set T to maximize the rent per mobile customer, independently 
from the intensity of competition in the market for mobile customers (see Wright, 2002). 
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Since σ
ααα )1( ii
i
i
P
−−=∂
∂
, it is straightforward to show that there exists a unique 
Nash equilibrium in prices which is defined implicitly as the solution to: 
 
(1) *
*
1 α
στ −+−= cP , where ]/)exp[(
1
*
0
*
σα PUVn +−+= . 
 
The corresponding equilibrium profit of this interior solution is: 
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We can now state our main prediction. 
 
Proposition 1 (waterbed effect). Lower termination rates are associated with higher 
bills to mobile customers. 
 
Proof. From totally differentiating the two equations (1), after a few manipulations, 
we obtain: 
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where n*0 1 αα −=  represents the share of the residual market which is not served by 
any mobile service. The same qualitative result applies to the waterbed effect with 
respect to the termination rate T, instead of the termination rent τ, as 
0
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∂=∂
∂
τ
PqN
T
P
IF . QED 
 
Proposition 1 states that the lower the MTR the higher the customer bill, i.e., the 
waterbed effect exists under general conditions of competition and product 
differentiation. It is also easy to show that other comparative statics properties of the 
equilibrium are in line with one’s intuition (see also Anderson et al., 1992). In 
particular, the mobile retail price declines with the number n of competing firms, and 
with the degree 1/σ of product homogeneity. The intensity of competition and other 
structural parameters are expected to affect somehow the waterbed effect. This is 
considered in the next result. 
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Proposition 2 (market structure). The waterbed effect on mobile prices is stronger 
the more intense competition is. The effect of competition is also magnified by market 
saturation. The waterbed effect is strongest in saturated and competitive markets. 
 
Proof. The role played by market saturation is obtained from (3). If the market is 
saturated (i.e., every customer has a mobile phone), then the residual market is zero, 
00 =α , and there is a “complete” waterbed effect, 1/* −=∂∂ τP , as any termination 
rent is entirely passed on to the consumer. If instead the market is not saturated, i.e., 
the demand for mobile phones is elastic at the equilibrium prices, then 00 >α , and the 
magnitude of the waterbed effect on the bill P* given by (3) is greater the smaller is 
*α , and therefore is bigger in absolute value when there are more competing firms or 
producing more homogenous products. Finally, note that the monopoly (or perfectly 
collusive) case has to be qualified when 00 =α . When no one buys the outside option 
(V0 → -∞) and n = 1, then α∗ → 1 and P* is not given by (1) but would instead be set 
as high as possible to just ensure participation of mobile customers. Only in this 
limiting case, 0/
0
1
* =∂∂
−∞→=Vn
TP . QED 
 
Our last result concerns the impact of the waterbed effect on total profits. 
 
Proposition 3 (profits). When the industry is perfectly competitive, exogenous 
changes in termination rates have no impact on profits as there is a “complete” 
waterbed effect. On the other hand, when the industry is not perfectly competitive, the 
waterbed effect is less than “complete” and profits are negatively affected by 
regulatory cuts of termination rates. 
 
Proof. We can obtain first the impact on equilibrium market shares of a change of the 
termination rent τ: 
 
0
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from which the impact on profits (2) is immediate, as profits increase with *α , thus 
0/* >∂Π∂ τ . The magnitude of this effect depends again on the intensity of 
competition and on how important the outside option is. If the market is saturated, 
00 =α , there is a “complete” waterbed effect, having no overall impact on profits. If 
instead the market is not saturated, 00 >α , then the more intense competition the 
bigger the impact of changes in termination rents. QED 
 
To sum up, in this section we answered our fundamental question: what is the 
effect of a cut of MTRs, below the level that would have been set by unregulated 
mobile firms? Clearly, the price of fixed-to-mobile calls would become cheaper after 
this cut, and more calls would be placed. This is the main aspect regulators have 
typically been interested in. However, there is also another effect that we have 
emphasized: the total bill paid by M will go up as a result of the cut of the MTR, via 
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the waterbed effect. We also made additional predictions on the magnitude of the 
waterbed effect and its impact on the profitability of mobile firms, according to the 
intensity of competition and to the degree of penetration of mobile telephony. In 
particular, if demand were perfectly inelastic (a saturated market, which is quite close 
to the reality in many countries today), the waterbed effect on mobile prices would 
still be at work in competitive markets, as it only depends on the zero profit constraint 
of competitive firms. A pure mobile monopolist, instead, would in this limiting case 
of a saturated market set the mobile price just to ensure participation of the last mobile 
customer, thus extracting her willingness to pay, and the resulting price would be 
unrelated to any termination rent. Propositions 1-3 constitute our three main 
predictions that we put to a test.12 
 
3. Econometric Specification  
Our empirical analysis is based on the following instrumental variable (IV) 
regression models: 
 
(4) lnPujct = αujc + αt + β1ln(MTR)jct + εujct 
(4a) lnΠjct = αjc + αt + β1ln(MTR)jct + εjct 
 
The dependent variable in (4) is the logarithm of retail prices (lnPujct) for the usage 
profile u = {low, medium, high} of mobile operator j in country c in quarter t. The 
dependent variable in (4a) is the logarithm of earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization (EBITDA), which is defined as the sum of operating 
income and depreciation and is our proxy for profits (lnΠjct). Time fixed effects (αt) 
and usage-operator-country (αujc) or operator-country (αjc) fixed effects control for 
time-invariant global trends and (usage-)operator-country characteristics respectively. 
The main variable of interest, ln(MTR)jct, is the logarithm of the mobile termination 
rates charged by mobile operators for terminating calls on their networks. 
The idea here is to estimate the waterbed effect on prices directly through the 
MTRs using regulation as an instrumental variable: Regulationjct, is for the moment a 
                                                 
12 As a more technical remark, since our empirical specification is in double logs, the coefficients of 
interest will be readily interpreted as elasticities. When relating our findings to whether the waterbed 
effect is “complete” or not, we observe that the relevant test should be conducted on the profit 
equation, i.e., looking at the impact of cuts in MTRs on profits (which should not change if any 
termination is entirely passed on to the customer, e.g., in a fully competitive situation). In Genakos and 
Valletti (2007) we show how, in general, one should not expect a unit elasticity for the bill price when 
the MTR changes, even in a model with perfect competition, as demand elasticities and cost shares will 
have an impact too. Hence, we warn against a too simplistic interpretation of the price elasticities. 
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binary indicator variable that takes the value one in the quarters when mobile 
termination rates are regulated. Regulation is a potentially valid instrument as it is not 
expected to influence retail prices other than the impact it induces via MTRs. This is 
because regulation acts on prices only indirectly via reducing MTRs, while regulators 
do not intervene in any other direct manner on customer prices. This approach also 
allows us to recover directly the elasticity of the waterbed effect by looking at β1. 
Due to the inclusion of (usage-)country-operator and time fixed effects, the impact 
of regulation on prices (or profits) through the MTR is identified from countries that 
introduced this regulation and measures the effect of regulation in reforming countries 
compared to the general evolution of prices or profits in non-reforming countries. In 
other words, countries that introduced regulation can be thought of as the “treated” 
group, while non-reforming countries are the “control” group.13 The “waterbed” 
prediction is that, ceteris paribus, regulation has a negative impact on MTRs (first 
stage estimates), which in turn (second stage estimates) has a negative effect on prices 
in (4) and a zero or positive effect on profits in (4a) depending on whether the effect is 
“complete” or not.  
This fixed effect specification allows us to control for time-invariant country-
operator characteristics that may influence both regulation and prices or profits. 
Importantly, it allows us to control for cost differences across mobile operators due to 
differential access to spectrum frequencies (e.g., some operators have access to 900 
MHz spectrum, other only to 1800 MHz) or differences in the cost of network 
deployment. Furthermore, the specification also accounts for common global trends.  
One important concern regarding this IV specification is that the consistency of 
the estimator requires strict exogeneity of the regulation variable. For example, our 
results would be biased if countries and operators, which have witnessed slower 
decrease in prices (including F2M prices) than comparable countries, were more 
likely candidates for regulation.14 The direction of causation here would be reversed: 
because of high retail prices, then MTRs are regulated. 
What we observe empirically is the exact opposite of the above concern. Figure 1 
plots the average (time and usage-country-operator demeaned) prices in countries that 
have experienced a change in regulation, six quarters before and after the introduction 
                                                 
13 In fact the simplest way to estimate the waterbed effect would be through a difference-in-difference 
specification. Results are identical to the ones reported here (see Appendix B, available on request). 
14 As analyzed in section 2, if left unregulated mobile operators have every incentive to charge “too 
high” termination rates independently from the competition they face and hence the level of retail 
prices. In principle, therefore, we expect every country to regulate MTRs sooner or later, which is 
indeed what we observe in the data. 
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of regulation. As we can see, compared to prices in the rest of the world, average 
prices in countries that experienced a change in regulation were actually lower before 
the introduction of regulation. Moreover, in line with our predictions, the introduction 
of regulation has a clear positive impact on prices that becomes stronger as regulation 
becomes progressively more binding over time.15 Hence, classical reverse causality 
seems to be less of a concern in our context.16 
Another endogeneity concern could be that regulatory intervention is the outcome 
of a bargaining (or lobbying) process between firms and the relevant authority, where 
affected firms will try to minimize the reduction on their MTRs and therefore the 
impact of regulation on prices and their profits.17 Indeed the large variability in MTRs 
across and within countries after the introduction of regulation can be taken as indirect 
evidence supporting this claim. Figure 2 plots the average (time and country-operator 
demeaned) profits (EBITDA) in countries that experienced a change in regulation, six 
quarters before and after the introduction of regulation. Compared to the rest of the 
world, profits of mobile operators in countries that experienced a change in regulation 
were actually higher before the introduction of regulation and were severely hit 
following its introduction. Hence, Figure 2 suggests that, despite any lobbying or 
bargaining effort, regulation had a strong negative effect on profits exactly as 
predicted by the theory when firms have market power. 
 
[Insert Figure 1, 2] 
 
However, someone still may argue that if firms were really successful in securing 
the best possible deals from regulators that would bias upwards any evidence of a 
waterbed effect when using only a binary indicator for regulation. We tackle this 
possibility head-on by distinguishing between countries that have introduced 
                                                 
15 Note that regulation does not take the form of a one-off intervention, hence we should not expect 
prices in affected countries to reach a new “steady state”. Termination rates are typically regulated over 
some period using “glide paths”, in which charges are allowed to fall gradually towards a target over 
the period. In other words, the continuous upward trend in prices after the introduction of regulation is 
another manifestation of the power of the waterbed effect as prices seem to respond with every 
tightening of the termination rates. We explore the effect of regulation over time in detail in section 5.2. 
16 In a related vein, we also checked growth rates of prices (again, time and usage-country-operator 
demeaned) in various groups of countries. Countries which experienced the introduction of regulation, 
did not show any significant variation in growth rates compared to countries which have been 
unregulated throughout the period, before regulation was introduced. In contrast, growth rates of prices 
in countries which experienced the introduction of regulation were significantly different from growth 
rates of prices in countries unregulated throughout the period, after regulation was introduced. 
17 Note that the operator fixed effects would capture any “permanent” ability of mobile firms to 
influence the regulators or the government. Hence, the argument here can possibly refer here only to 
firms’ bargaining or lobbying activities that have time-varying effectiveness. 
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substantial price cuts in MTRs and countries that have regulated MTRs too but only 
mildly. In the spirit of Card and Kruger (1994), we construct two additional indices. 
The first one is: 
 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
−=
regulated is  if 
dunregulate is  if 0
index 
jct
jct
jctct
jct
jct MTR
MTR
MTRMaxMTR
MTR
MaxMTR   
 
In other words, when the country is unregulated, the index takes a value of zero. If 
instead the country is regulated, the index takes larger values the more regulated a 
mobile operator is, compared to the operator that is regulated the least in the same 
country and period. This index takes advantage not only of the different timing of the 
introduction of regulation across countries, but also of the widespread variation on the 
rates imposed across operators within countries. This variation in regulated MTRs 
was particularly evident in countries where there was a large asymmetry between the 
“large” incumbents and the “small” entrants. While from a theoretical point of view 
the “bottleneck” problem exists independently from the size of an operator, in 
practice, regulators have been more reluctant in cutting the MTRs of the new entrants. 
They did this most likely with the idea of helping them secure a stronger position in 
the market. Thus new entrants have been either unregulated for many periods (while 
the incumbents were regulated at the same time), or they have been regulated only 
mildly, while more substantial price cuts were imposed on the incumbents. Hence, in 
this index, the highest MTR within a country at every period becomes the benchmark 
for comparing how tough regulation has been on the rest of the firms.  
Our second regulation index is based on the same principle, but restricts the 
sample to only those countries for which we know with certainty that there is at least 
one fully unregulated operator. For example, the UK was one of the first countries to 
introduce termination rates regulation, but throughout this period mobile operator 3 
(Hutchison) was left completely unregulated. Thus, for the purposes of this index we 
use the termination rates that this firm was charging as a benchmark for all the other 
firms. This exercise restricts our sample size, but makes the identification even more 
transparent and exogenous. Hence, the second index is: 
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In other words, the index takes the value of zero when the country is unregulated. 
If instead the country is regulated, we construct an index comparing the rate each 
operator is regulated to the one charged by the unregulated firm in the same country 
and period. Both these indexes allow us to get different measures of the severity of 
regulation in each country and period. 
A related endogeneity concern could be that the countries that introduced the 
regulation in our sample are not a “random” representative sample. One potential 
story behind this sample selection argument could be that the worst affected firms 
would try their best to delay the introduction of any regulation. Since we only observe 
a sample of countries that introduce MTR regulation later than some others, our 
waterbed effect estimates might be upward biased. 
Regulatory intervention does not occur randomly, but is the outcome of a long 
regulatory and political process. However, this process regarding MTRs has been 
driven in practice by legal and institutional aspects. The UK has been at the forefront 
and started regulating MTRs already back in 1997. Other countries followed suit. 
Importantly, the European Commission introduced a New Regulatory Framework for 
electronic communications in 2002. The Commission defined mobile termination as a 
relevant market. Procedurally, every Member State (EU 15 at the time) was (and still 
is) obliged to conduct a market analysis of that market and, to the extent that market 
failures were found, remedies would have to be introduced. Indeed, all the countries 
that completed the analysis did find problems with no single exception, and imposed 
(differential) cuts to MTRs (typically, substantial cuts to incumbents and either no cut 
or only mild cuts on entrants). Hence, the timing of the introduction of regulated 
MTRs, but also the severity with which they were imposed across mobile operators 
has been driven by this regulatory process and varied widely across countries with no 
systematic pattern.18 
                                                 
18 Very importantly, regulators have restricted powers to intervene on retail mobile prices. In order to 
do that, they would have to find either single dominance (i.e., monopoly power), or joint dominance 
(i.e., tacit collusion, which is extremely difficult to prove in courts). In fact, in our sample, no regulator 
has ever imposed any remedy on mobile retail markets. Table A4 in the Appendix presents the 
countries and timing of MTR regulation’s introduction in chronological order. There is no discernible 
pattern across countries and their timing of regulation’s introduction, with both the earlier group of 
countries and the one that introduced MTR regulation last being a mix of more developed and less 
developed countries. 
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Another consideration for our framework is that, conditional on (usage-)country-
operator and time fixed-effects, we omit any other time-varying factors that might 
affect prices (such as competition or market saturation) or regulation itself. We will 
thus allow for regional-time fixed effects (section 5.1), and also augment our model to 
explicitly consider the influences of market structure and market saturation (section 
6.1). Finally, in section 5.2 we examine the dynamic impact of the introduction of 
regulation allowing for flexible time-varying effects of regulation on prices (Laporte 
and Windmeijer, 2005) with the aim of distinguishing among any anticipation, short-
run and long-run effects.  
Yet, in spite of the various model permutations and controls, someone may still 
argue that some time-varying aspects of the political and regulatory environment 
might be correlated with the timing of the introduction of regulation. A number of 
recent papers (Besley and Case, 2000; Duso and Röller, 2003; Duso, 2005) indicate 
the importance of these regulatory and political variables for the assessment of market 
outcomes. Note that country-operator fixed effects in our framework control for the 
average effectiveness of the regulatory and political environment. Moreover, as 
discussed above, after the adoption of the EU framework in 2002, literally every 
country in our sample (both within and outside EU) introduced this regulation within 
a period of four years. Hence, although we find it unlikely that the efficiency of 
regulatory authorities has changed so quickly19 within such a short period of time, it is 
important to bear in mind this caveat when interpreting our results. 
 
4. Data 
For the purpose of our analysis we matched three different data sources. Firstly, we 
use Cullen International to get information on mobile termination rates. Cullen 
International is considered the most reliable source for MTRs and collects all 
termination rates for official use of the European Commission. Using this source and 
various other industry and regulatory publications, we were also in a position to 
identify the dates in which regulation was introduced across countries and operators.  
Secondly, quarterly information on the total bills paid by consumers across 
operators and countries is obtained from Teligen. Teligen collects and compares all 
available tariffs of the two largest mobile operators for thirty OECD countries. It 
constructs three different consumer usage profiles (large, medium and low) based on 
the number of calls and messages, the average call length and the time and type of 
                                                 
19 Note that all regulatory and political effectiveness indexes that we are aware of have at best an 
annual frequency, while our dataset is on a quarterly basis. 
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call.20 A distinction between pre-paid (pay-as-you-go) and post-paid (contract) is also 
accounted for. These consumer profiles are then held fixed when looking across 
countries and time. 
Thirdly, we use quarterly information taken from the Global Wireless Matrix of 
the investment bank Merrill Lynch (henceforth, ML). ML compiles basic operating 
metrics for mobile operators in forty-six countries. For our purposes, we use the 
reported average monthly revenue per user (ARPU) and the earnings margin before 
interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA). Through this source we also 
obtain information on penetration and number of mobile operators in each country, 
together with the number of subscribers and their market shares for each operator. 
All consumer prices, termination rates and revenue data were converted to euros 
using the Purchasing Power Parities (PPP) currency conversions published by the 
OECD to ease comparability. None of our results depends on this transformation. 
More detailed data description, together with the dates of the introduction of 
regulation and summary statistics, can be found in Appendix A. 
The various datasources have different strengths and weaknesses regarding our 
empirical question. The Teligen dataset has two main advantages. First, by fixing a 
priori the calling profiles of customers, it provides us with information on the best 
choices of these customers across countries and time. Second, the prices reported in 
this dataset include much of the relevant information for this industry, such as 
inclusive minutes, quantity discounts, etc. (although it does not include handset 
subsidies). However, this richness of information comes at the cost of having data for 
only the two biggest operators of every country at each point in time (although they 
cover 80 percent of the market on average). For instance, if a country, such as the UK, 
had five mobile operators, possibly regulated differentially over time, only two 
observations per customer profile would be available. This reduces the variability and 
makes identification of our variables of interest harder, especially given that the 
biggest mobile operators are often regulated at the same rate. 
On the contrary, the ML dataset provides us with information on actual revenues 
rather than prices. The dependent variables that we use are primarily EBITDA (a 
measure of accounting profit and cash flow) and ARPU (which consists of all 
revenues, including revenues from MTR). These are aggregate measures 
encompassing all revenues associated with mobile voice services. Therefore, they 
have to be interpreted as measures of an operator’s revenues and profitability rather 
                                                 
20 Note that these are hypothetical profiles and not actual customer bills. 
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than the total customer bill. Both these accounting measures clearly suffer from 
endogeneity problems, which could introduce bias and inconsistency in our results. 
However, this dataset contains useful information on all mobile operators and hence it 
allows us to exploit more within-country variation. For this reason, we have decided 
to use also this data, with the purpose of corroborating our main results. 
 
5. Results 
Table 1 reports our benchmark results from specifications (4) and (4a).21 The first 
three columns use the price information from Teligen as the dependent variable. The 
data for these columns consist of the best possible deals for each user profile among 
all possible contracts available, both pre-paid and post-paid. For that reason, we also 
add a binary variable (Pre-paidjct) indicating whether the best deal was on a pre-paid 
contract or not.22 First stage results across all columns confirm that regulation has a 
significantly negative effect on MTR as expected. In addition, regulation does not 
seem to suffer from any weak-instruments problems as indicated by the first stage F-
tests. Column 1 shows that that regulation through MTR has indeed a negative and 
significant effect on prices. The magnitude of the elasticity of the waterbed effect is 
above 1. Over the period considered, regulation has cut MTR rates by 11% and, at the 
same time, has increased bills to mobile customers by (-0.11) × (-1.207) = 13.3% (the 
waterbed effect). Notice that the coefficient on pre-paid is insignificant, indicating 
that prices on the pre-paid deals were no different than those on monthly contracts. 
In column 2, the elasticity of the waterbed effect is lower at 0.938 using the more 
sophisticated index of regulation MaxMTR, but still negative and highly significant. 
This 4.7% waterbed effect roughly23 translates to a 25 euros increase on the yearly bill 
per subscriber, or some 750 million euros extra in total in our sample.24 Similarly, in 
column 3 when we restrict our sample to only those countries we know with certainty 
had at least one unregulated operator, we still get a negative and significant effect.25 
Notice also that the coefficient on pre-paid becomes now negative and significant, 
indicating that pre-paid customers were getting significantly better deals from the two 
                                                 
21 All reported standard errors are based on a generalized White-like formula, allowing for country-
operator(-usage) level clustered heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (Bertrand et al., 2004). 
22 It is important to mention that the MTR is applied uniformly and does not distinguish, say, between 
calls to heavy users on contracts and calls to low users on prepaid. However, the waterbed price 
reaction of the mobile firm to changes in MTR can in principle differ by type of user or call, since their 
profile of received calls can differ, or the intensity of competition can differ by type of user too. 
23 Based on the average price paid the year before the introduction of regulation for the countries that 
experience a change in regulation in our sample. 
24 Based on the average number of subscribers the year before the introduction of regulation. 
25 The elasticities are not directly comparable as the regulatory variables have different mean values. 
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main mobile operators when they were faced with an unregulated competitor. A 
potential explanation of this result is that incumbent firms were offering better deals 
to pre-paid customers only when faced with unregulated rivals as a way of protecting 
their overall market share, but also putting pressure on the prices charged by them. 
Next, we look at the impact of regulation on profitability measures using 
specification (4a). The last three columns on Table 1 report the effect on EBITDA, 
while we relegate similar results on the impact on ARPU to Appendix B. Column 4 
shows that regulation had a negative effect on profit margins, although the data is 
considerably noisier. Using our two indexes, instead of the binary regulation variable 
(columns 5 and 6), reveal again a negative relationship, though the effect is not 
statistically significant.  
We must remark that the ML dataset is probably less reliable than the Teligen 
dataset, so we take our conclusion on accounting profits more cautiously. In addition, 
all these results have to be qualified as termination rents could be also exhausted with 
non-price strategies, i.e., increasing advertising, or giving handset subsidies that we 
cannot control for. However, we do not expect handset subsidies effects to be too 
relevant for pre-paid customers, and the test on EBITDA should take these additional 
factors into account. If handset subsidies were linked to inter-temporal subsidies 
(short-run losses are incurred to get long-run profits from captive customers), our 
results on profitability are, if anything, biased downwards. This is because a cut in 
MTR would look more profitable as fewer losses are made in the short run. 
Taken together these benchmark estimates confirm our theoretical intuition that 
there exists a strong and significant waterbed effect in mobile telephony. If markets 
were fully competitive there should be no impact on profits (“complete” waterbed 
effect). However, these results seem to suggest that competitors have some degree of 
market power as their profits are negatively affected post regulation, albeit with 
considerable less statistical precision. 
 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
5.1 Robustness  
In Table 2 we examine the robustness of our benchmark estimates. In the first two 
columns we restrict our data by excluding the countries that were unregulated 
throughout our sample. First stage estimates of regulation on MTR are almost 
unchanged, while the overall waterbed effect increases slightly. Next, we estimate an 
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even more restrictive version of our model by allowing for regional-time fixed effects. 
Our sample of countries can be naturally divided into three macro regions: Western 
Europe, Eastern Europe and Rest of the World (Australia, New Zealand and Japan).26 
Western European countries have been all subject to the New Regulatory Framework 
adopted by the European Commission, while other Eastern European countries have 
only recently been subject to regulation with the accession of new member States. 
Controlling for these regional effects in columns 3 and 4, results in an even stronger 
waterbed effect (15.2% and 5.1% respectively), without reducing its statistical 
significance.27 
Similar conclusions can be drawn for the effect of regulation on EBITDA. In 
columns 5 and 6, where our control group consists of the regulated countries, the 
negative effect of regulation is stronger using the binary indicator for regulation and 
negative but not significant when using the MaxMTR index. The inclusion of the 
regional-time fixed effects in columns 7 and 8 increases the magnitude of the 
waterbed effect without affecting much their statistical significance.  
 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
5.2 Dynamic regulation effects 
The effect of regulation on prices might not be just instantaneous. On the one hand, 
termination rates are typically regulated over some periods using “glide paths”, in 
which charges are allowed to fall gradually towards a target over that period. The 
temporal adjustment path is known and anticipated by operators, at least before a new 
market review is conducted. On the other hand, there could also be some inertia. For 
instance, customers may be locked in with an operator for a certain period, therefore 
there would be no immediate need for mobile operators to adjust their prices as these 
customers would not be lost right away. Alternatively, when termination rates change, 
it may take some time for operators to adjust retail prices because of various “menu” 
costs. Hence, we would like to investigate whether firms anticipated regulation 
(possibly by trying to affect the outcomes of the regulatory process) and indeed 
whether the effect of regulation was short-lived or had any persistent long term 
effects. To quantify these dynamic effects of the waterbed phenomenon, we define 
                                                 
26 These joint region-time fixed effects should also control for any potential scale economy effects 
enjoyed by mobile firms operating in multiple neighbouring countries. 
27 We do not report results using the UnregulatedMTR index with the regional-country fixed effects 
because the Western Europe region binary indicator includes all the countries that had one operator 
being not regulated. 
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binary indicators for twelve, non-overlapping, quarters around the introduction of 
regulation and a final binary variable isolating the long-run effect of regulation. Our 
specification now is a simpler difference-in-difference model allowing for flexible 
time-varying effects of regulation on prices and profits: 
 
(5) lnPujct = αujc + αt + β1DT-6jct + β2DT-5jct + …+ β12DT+5jct + β13DT+6jct + εujct 
(5a) lnΠjct = αjc + αt + β1DT-6jct + β2DT-5jct + …+ β12DT+5jct + β13DT+6jct + εjct 
 
where DT-6jct = 1 in the sixth quarter before regulation, DT-5jct = 1 in the fifth quarter 
before regulation, and similarly for all other quarters until DT+6jct = 1 in the sixth 
quarter after regulation and in all subsequent quarters. Each binary indicator equals 
zero in all other quarters than those specified. Hence, the base period is the time 
before the introduction of regulation, excluding the anticipation period (i.e., seven 
quarters before regulation backwards). This approach accounts for probable 
anticipation effects (as captured by DT-6 to DT-1 binary indicators) as well as short 
(captured by DT to DT+5) and long run effects (captured by DT+6).28  
Figure 3 plots the regression coefficients on these binary indicators from (5) 
together with their 95% confidence interval. As expected, regulation has no effect on 
prices six to four quarters before the actual implementation. However, there is some 
small but statistically significant anticipation of the regulatory intervention three to 
one quarters before. As discussed before, for the large majority of countries regulation 
was preceded by a long consultation period launched by the regulator. Our results 
reveal that operators started cutting MTRs slightly and adjusted their price schedules 
upwards even before the actual implementation of the new termination rates. 
However, it is the actual implementation of the regulation that has the biggest 
impact on prices as revealed by the immediate increase on the coefficients after 
regulation. In other words, regulation is binding from the beginning and as it tightens 
up over time, the waterbed effect increases. As we can see in Figure 3, regulation also 
seems to have a large and very significant long-run waterbed effect. The coefficient 
estimate on DT+6, which quantifies the effect of regulation on prices post the sixth 
quarter after its introduction, is strongly significant and implies a long run elasticity of 
the waterbed effect of 33%. Note that this coefficient is not directly comparable to the 
previous estimates of the waterbed effect, as it incorporates the effect not only of the 
introduction of regulation, but also of the progressive tightening of termination rates. 
                                                 
28 See Laporte and Windmeijer (2005) for a discussion of this approach. 
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What is crucial is that prices seem to respond continuously with every tightening of 
the rules giving rise to a waterbed phenomenon that is not a one-off event. 
Figure 4 plots the regression coefficients together with their 95% confidence 
interval for (5a). Post regulation there is a very clear negative trend on the estimated 
coefficients (similar to the one in Figure 2), albeit considerably noisier than the 
waterbed effect on the total bill. Strictly speaking, the only statistically significant 
coefficient is the one that captures the long run effect, DT+6, indicating that the 
regulation had a strong negative effect on profits post the sixth quarter after its 
introduction. In other words, the negative effect of regulation on profits seem to 
appear with a significant delay compare to the waterbed effect on prices. This could 
be either because EBITDA is only an imperfect, accounting proxy for profits or due to 
non-price strategies (that we do not observe) adopted by the operators trying to 
counterbalance the immediate impact of the waterbed effect on prices. 
 
[Insert Figure 3, 4] 
 
6. Interaction with competition and further evidence  
6.1 Competition and market penetration 
Having established that the waterbed effect exists and has a strong long run effect, 
we now want to investigate in greater detail how competition affects this 
phenomenon. Competition is obviously expected to have a direct impact on prices: the 
more competitive the market, the lower the prices to customers. Besides this effect, 
however, if termination rates are “high” (e.g., unregulated) or a substantial mark-up is 
allowed, competition is expected to have an additional impact via the waterbed effect: 
the more competitive the industry, the lower the prices will be, on top of the direct 
effect, as any termination rent will be passed on to the customers. As discussed in 
Section 2, a waterbed effect is expected to exist also under monopoly, though the 
effect is milder as some rents will be kept by the monopolist. However, the waterbed 
effect is not expected to be very relevant under monopoly when the market is very 
saturated and the monopolist still has an interest in covering it. Hence, in our 
empirical specification it is crucial to control for subscription penetration levels, since 
this is a good proxy for subscription demand elasticity at different stages of the 
product life cycle of mobile telephony. Our specification reads: 
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(6) lnPujct = αujc + αt + β1ln(MTR)jct + β2ln(competitors)ct + β3ln(penetration)ct + 
γ1[ln(ΜTR)jct×ln(competitors)ct] + γ2[ln(ΜTR)jct×ln(penetration)ct] + 
γ3[ln(penetration)ct×ln(competitors)ct] + 
δ[ln(ΜTR)jct×ln(competitors)ct×ln(penetration)ct] + εujct 
 
Equation (6) is an extension of our previous specification (4) with the aim to 
specify a particular channel that might affect the intensity of the waterbed effect.29 
Our proxy for the intensity of competition is simply the number of rival firms 
(competitorsct) in each country and period. The number of mobile operators in a 
country can be taken as exogenous as the number of licences is determined by 
spectrum availability. Over the period considered, several countries have witnessed 
the release of additional licences. The degree of market saturation/maturity is 
measured as the percentage of the population with a mobile phone (penetrationct). Our 
main coefficient of interest is δ, where MTR is interacted both with the intensity of 
competition and with the degree of market saturation. 
Results are reported in Table 3. Column 1 is the baseline waterbed effect, 
comparable to that of column 1 in Table 1, restricted to the sample of firms and 
countries for which we have information on all these variables. Column 2 shows that a 
larger number of competing firms exerts the expected negative impact on prices. In 
column 3,30 the coefficient on the interaction between the competition variable and 
MTR is positive but insignificant, whereas in column 4 when we introduce all 
interaction terms, this coefficient becomes positive but barely significant.31  
As we discuss in our theoretical section, the effect of competition on termination 
rates would differ depending on the level of market saturation and for that reason in 
column 5 we introduce our preferred specification which includes this triple 
                                                 
29 This specification might also be viewed as correcting for other time varying factors that might affect 
prices or regulation itself, conditional on the country-operator and time fixed effects. A spurious 
correlation pointing towards a high waterbed would arise if, for example, a country is not regulated but 
is competitive and has low prices, while another country is regulated with low MTR but is also quite 
concentrated, so it has high prices: so far we attribute econometrically higher prices to the waterbed 
(via regulation), even if - in principle - the waterbed effect did not exist at all. While this seems highly 
unlikely (typically, countries with low MTRs are also competitive, at least anecdotally, which should 
give rise to the opposite bias) and runs contrary to the evidence presented in Figure 1, we explicitly 
consider the influences of market structure and market saturation here. 
30 The instruments used for this specification are: regulation, interactions of regulation with the other 
exogenous variables (namely competitors and penetration), the number of own products for each 
mobile operator in the market (to capture the intensity of competition in the product space, à la Berry et 
al., 1995) and interactions of the residuals (from the regression: MTR on competitors, penetration, 
regulation and the various fixed effects) with competitors and penetration (Wooldridge, 2002). First 
stage results are reported in Appendix B (available on request). 
31 The instruments used are the same as in the previous column 3. 
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interaction term.32 Our coefficient of interest, δ, is negative and strongly significant 
indicating that the waterbed effect is stronger the more intense competition is in 
markets with high levels of market penetration and high termination rates. This result 
is in line with our theoretical predictions where we pointed out the need to control for 
penetration levels when comparing competitive markets with concentrated ones. 
Notice that the direct waterbed effect still exists in all markets, as β1 is negative 
and very significant. The rest of the coefficients are also reassuring. We find that 
competition has a strong, negative direct impact on prices, besides any waterbed 
effect (β2 = -0.344) and that prices are also systematically lower in more mature 
markets (β3 = -3.228). When MTR is simply interacted with competition, not 
controlling for penetration levels, there is no statistically significant relationship.  
We also find a positive and significant coefficient on the simple interaction 
between MTR and saturation (γ2 = 1.422) and on the interaction between the number 
of competitors and market saturation (γ3 = 2.346). Although these coefficients are not 
our main focus, a couple of comments are in place. A positive coefficient on γ2 
indicates that the waterbed effect is lower in higher penetration markets. Intuitively, 
low penetration markets usually consist of heavy users for whom the waterbed effect 
is expected to be strong. But as the market becomes more saturated, this typically 
involves attracting marginal users who make and receive very few calls. Hence, we 
expect the waterbed effect to decrease as the market becomes more saturated because 
of the different types of consumers that are drawn into the mobile customer pool. On 
the contrary, we have no prior expectations on the coefficient γ3 as there is no strong 
reason to believe that, controlling for the number of competitors, the impact of 
competition should be more or less intense as the market saturates. On the one hand, a 
negative coefficient would arise if operators become less capacity constrained and 
compete more fiercely. On the other hand, if operators in mature markets tend to 
collude more easily over time, the result would be a positive coefficient. 
Finally, in column 6, where we use as an instrument the MaxMTR index instead of 
the binary variable Regulation,33 we confirm the conclusions previously drawn. 
Results are unaffected for the majority of the coefficients, with the direct waterbed 
effect (β1) and the coefficient on the triple interaction (δ) becoming even stronger. 
                                                 
32 The instruments used are the same as in the previous column 4 with the addition of the triple 
interaction of the residuals (from the regression mentioned in fn 30) with competitors and penetration. 
33 The rest of the instruments used are the same as in column 5. 
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We also experimented using the HHI index instead of the simple number of 
competing operators, as a different measure of competition. While the coefficient on 
the triple interaction (δ) is still significant and has the expected sign (now the 
coefficient is positive, as an increase in HHI means a lessening of competition), some 
other results are less stable (see Table B10 in Appendix B). In our opinion, this 
reveals the limitations of our dataset (although HHI is potentially an alternative 
measure of competition, it clearly suffers from a more serious endogeneity problem 
than the number of competitors as discussed above) and of our reduced-form 
methodology regarding the effect of market structure on the waterbed phenomenon. 
Future research using a structural approach and more detailed country-level data is 
required to further understand these mechanisms. 
 
[Insert Table 3] 
 
6.2 Mobile-to-mobile calls and the structure of tariffs 
The call termination problem that we described in Section 2.1, and then tested in 
Section 5, is relevant when the market of callers from fixed networks is separate from 
the market of receivers on mobile networks. This has been the focus of the literature 
on MTRs and the main concern of regulatory authorities. However, mobile firms also 
interconnect with each other. There is therefore another termination rate, for mobile-
to-mobile (M2M) calls, that should be of interest (see Armstrong and Wright, 2009). 
In many jurisdictions M2M rates are not regulated, apart from imposing reciprocity 
between mobile operators, and therefore cuts in fixed-to-mobile (F2M) rates should 
not apply to other types of calls. However, in practice, F2M calls can be sometime 
converted into M2M calls by some special equipment (there exists such a technical 
possibility, called GSM gateways). Then, if the F2M termination rate is higher than 
the M2M termination rate, there can be arbitrage opportunities. Thus regulation, even 
if it formally regulates only the F2M termination rate, may effectively set a limit also 
for M2M termination. The ‘pure’ waterbed effect from F2M calls can be then 
confounded by the M2M effects that have been extensively analyzed by the literature 
on “two way” access charges initiated by the seminal works of Armstrong (1998) and 
Laffont et al. (1998). 
A distinction has been made in this literature between competition in linear prices 
(which are relevant for pay-as-you go or pre-paid contracts) and competition in multi-
part tariffs (which are relevant for post-pay contracts). When competition is in linear 
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prices, firms would ‘collude’ by setting ‘high’ reciprocal M2M termination rates in a 
typical raising-each-other’s-cost fashion. Thus, if regulation of F2M rates affects also 
M2M rates, then firms can collude ‘less’. Less collusion means that bills will go 
down, which would contrast the ‘pure’ waterbed effect. If, instead, competition is in 
multi-part tariffs, the theory predicts that the higher M2M rates, the more expensive 
calls per minute, but the lower the fixed fee of the multi-part tariff paid by the 
customer. This reinforces the waterbed on the total bill, in particular via a big impact 
on the fixed fee. 
Thus we have two additional predictions from the theory. First, the waterbed 
effect should operate differently between linear mobile contracts, and more complex 
multi-part tariffs. In particular, the waterbed effect should be stronger for the latter 
than for the former where it is diluted by the reduced ability to collude. Second, 
within multi-part tariffs, the waterbed effect should be very strong on the fixed fee.  
Our pricing information from Teligen (best deals) allows us to distinguish 
between pre-pay and post-pay contracts. Pre-pay deals are a good proxy for linear 
contracts, while post-pay deals are typically composed of a monthly fixed fee and 
several other charges. Within post-pay contracts, we can thus further distinguish 
between their fixed and variable amount spend on calls. In line with the theoretical 
predictions, we found that the waterbed effect is stronger for post-pay contracts 
compared to pre-paid deals (though it exists overall also for the latter). Moreover, 
among post-pay contracts, we also found that the effect arises mainly from the fixed 
fee, while the variable component of the bill is not affected significantly. 
There are additional reasons to believe that distinguishing between pre-paid and 
post-paid customers is important. Customers on long-term contracts may be looking 
only at similar long-term deals, and may not be interested in a temporary pre-paid 
subscription, even if this turned out to be cheaper for a while. Switching among 
operators takes time and for a business user this might not be a very realistic option, 
even in the presence of number portability. Conversely, customers on pre-paid cards, 
may have budget constraints and do not want to commit to long-term contracts where 
they would have to pay a fixed monthly fee for one or more years. Again, these 
customers may want to look only at offers among pre-paid contracts. For these 
reasons, we also investigated whether there is a difference in the waterbed effect 
between pre-paid and post-paid users, when each type of user is limited in her choices 
within the same type of contracts. We found that the differences between the waterbed 
effect for monthly subscribers and pre-paid customers are quite large. Additionally, 
25 
 
within monthly contracts, the increase of the bill following a cut in MTRs is due to a 
change of the fixed, rather than the variable component of the bill, as before.34 
 
7. Conclusions 
Regulation of fixed-to-mobile termination charges has become increasingly 
prevalent around the world during the last decade. A large theoretical literature has 
demonstrated that, independently of the intensity of competition for mobile 
customers, mobile operators have an incentive to set charges that will extract the 
largest possible surplus from fixed users. This bottleneck problem provided scope for 
the (possibly) welfare-improving regulatory intervention. However, reducing the level 
of termination charges can potentially increase the level of prices for mobile 
subscribers, the so-called “waterbed” effect. 
In this paper we provide the first econometric evidence that the introduction of 
regulation resulted in a significant waterbed effect ranging from a minimum of 2% up 
to a maximum of 15%. However, although the waterbed effect is high, our analysis 
also provides evidence that it is not “complete”: oligopolistic mobile firms keep part 
of the termination rents instead of passing them on to their customers. Finally, our 
empirical analysis also reveals that the waterbed effect is stronger the more intense 
competition is in markets with high levels of market penetration and high termination 
rates. 
Our findings have three important implications. First, mobile telephony exhibits 
features typical of two-sided markets. The market for subscription and outgoing 
services is closely interlinked to the market for termination of incoming calls. 
Therefore, any antitrust or regulatory analysis must take these linkages into account 
either at the stage of market definition or market analysis. 
Second, any welfare analysis of regulation of termination rates cannot ignore the 
presence of the waterbed effect. If the demand for mobile subscription was very 
inelastic, the socially optimal MTR would be the cost of termination (though the 
regulation of MTR would impact on the distribution of consumer surplus among fixed 
and mobile subscribers). If, instead, the mobile market was not saturated and still 
growing there would be the need to calibrate carefully the optimal MTR. It is 
therefore key to understand the behaviour of marginal users that might give up their 
handsets when the waterbed effect is at work. 
                                                 
34 All results are statistically significant at 1%, resulting in a waterbed effect of 15.9% for post-pay and 
5.1% for pre-pay deals. Detailed results are in Appendix B (available on request). 
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Third, our analysis on the waterbed effect is also relevant in the current debate of 
regulation of other types of charges. The European Commission voted in 2007 to cap 
“international roaming charges”35 for making and receiving phone calls within the 
EU. The aim is to reduce the cost of making a mobile phone call while abroad and 
hence encourage more overseas (but within EU) phone use. A reduction in roaming 
charges may cause a similar waterbed phenomenon, whereby prices of domestic calls 
may increase as operators seek to compensate for their lost revenue elsewhere. While 
the magnitude of the waterbed effect caused by this new legislation is debatable, our 
results demonstrate that regulators have to acknowledge its existence and carefully 
account for it in their welfare calculations. 
Future research should concentrate on two aspects that we consider to be the 
limitations of this paper. On the one hand, more detailed information would allow 
researchers to overcome our data restrictions. Having price data on a larger number of 
mobile operators within countries, would allow for joint country-time fixed effects to 
be properly controlled for in the empirical specification. Furthermore, to investigate 
the marginal consumer’s behaviour before and after the introduction of regulation and 
their elasticity regarding the waterbed effect, more detailed consumer-level 
information is required. On the other hand, given the non-linear retail price schedules 
and the complex incentives schemes (handsets, personal vs. business buyers’ 
contracts, etc.) provided by mobile operators, more detailed customer information at a 
country level would allow us to model more satisfactorily the effect of competition 
and market penetration on the waterbed effect. Such a structural model would also 
enable us to quantify the effects of various regulatory interventions and their welfare 
implications. We intend to pursue both avenues in our future research. 
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APPENDIX A – DATA DESCRIPTION AND MATCHING INFORMATION 
 
To test the waterbed effect we use a variety of different sources. Regarding MTRs, 
we use the biannual data from Cullen International (1999-2006). Cullen International 
collects all European MTR information since April 2003 for official use of the 
European Commission and for that reason is considered one of the most reliable 
sources for MTRs. We verified the accuracy of this information against Vodafone’s 
own sources and data published by the European Commission’s Independent 
Regulators Group (IRG), but also other third party sources. 
In order to allow for meaningful comparisons between countries, average rates per 
minute have been calculated for each country using the following assumptions:  
(i) A common distribution of traffic throughout the week. This has allowed us to 
estimate the average termination rate for each operator, taking into account 
variations in the weekly charging periods. For example, UK and Ireland have 
relatively short peak rate charging periods, whilst France has a lengthy peak rate 
charging period. Note that the IRG use default weights of 50% (weekday 
daytime), 25% (weekday evening and night) and 25% (weekend). The IRG 
method fails to capture differences in charging periods between operators. 
Neither of these weighting patterns will correspond to the actual traffic volumes 
in any one individual country and so, for example, the MTR will be over-stated 
in countries that have a lower proportion of weekday daytime calls. However, if 
traffic distributions were to be varied between countries, cross-country 
comparisons of average termination rates would not be on a true like-to-like 
basis. 
(ii) For most countries a negative exponential distribution of call lengths has been 
assumed. This is only relevant in cases where countries have an indivisible unit 
charging structure (e.g., Portugal and Spain, and France prior to January 2004). 
(iii) An average call duration of 2 minutes has been assumed for all countries. Note 
that the IRG assumes an average call length of 3 minutes, which is likely to be 
an over-statement for mobile calls. This is likely to have the biggest impact in 
Portugal, where there are significant differences in cost between the first and 
subsequent minutes. For this reason we have taken particular care to ensure that 
the average call length assumption is indeed appropriate for Portugal. 
(iv) Rates have been averaged over mobile operators according to national 
subscriber shares. In theory, traffic volumes should be used, but this information 
is not published for all operators. Checking the accuracy of calculations using 
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Vodafone’s traffic volumes for a number of countries did not reveal any 
significant differences. 
 
We obtained mobile operator’s prices from Teligen (2002Q3-2006Q1), which 
reports quarterly information on the total bills paid by consumers across OECD 
countries based on three usage profiles (high, medium and low). Teligen essentially 
calculates these total bills across countries and for each usage profile so that they take 
into account registration or installation charges, monthly rental charges, a number of 
SMS messages per month and it also takes into consideration any inclusive minutes 
(or SMS messages) or call allowance value included in monthly subscriptions. For 
each of the operators covered, a set of packages is included so that the cheapest 
package offered by the operator can be calculated for each of the three usage profiles. 
Finally, mobile operators’ accounting and market information comes from the 
Global Wireless Matrix of Merrill Lynch, which is also available on a quarterly basis 
(2000Q1-2005Q3). Merrill Lynch compiles basic operating metrics for mobile 
operators in 46 countries globally. For our purposes, we use the earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) and, in Appendix B, we also 
report results with the average revenue per user (ARPU). The ARPU is calculated by 
dividing service revenues by the average subscriber base during the quarter. Service 
revenues include monthly service charges and usage fees, roaming, long distance and 
subscriptions to mobile data services. Some operators also include non-service 
revenues (e.g., equipment sales) in their ARPU calculation. The EBITDA margin is 
calculated by dividing total EBITDA by total revenues. Note that although we would 
ideally like to calculate the margin on only the service revenues (i.e., excluding 
equipment sales from the denominator) few operators disclose the margins on service 
revenues. We use the EBITDA margin as a proxy for profit and cash flow. All the 
basic variables are described in Table A1.  
Table A2 provides the summary statistics for the key variables used in Table 1 and 
2. Table A3 provides similar information for the variables used in Table 3. Finally, 
Table A4 presents the countries and timing of regulation’s introduction in 
chronological order. 
 
 Figure 1: Average Price around the introduction of Regulation 
 
Notes: Data from Teligen. Figure 1 plots the average (time and country-operator-usage demeaned) logarithm of the 
PPP adjusted price paid per usage profile in countries that have experienced a change in regulation, six quarters 
before and after the introduction of regulation of fixed-to-mobile termination charges. The two continuous grey lines 
indicate the linear trend before and after the introduction of regulation. Regulation takes the form of “glide paths”, in 
which termination charges are allowed to fall gradually towards a target over the period. 
 
 
Figure 2: Average Profits around the introduction of Regulation 
 
Notes: Data from Merrill Lynch. Figure 2 plots the average (time and country-operator demeaned) logarithm of the 
EBITDA in countries that experienced a change in regulation, six quarters before and after the introduction of 
regulation of fixed-to-mobile termination charges. The two continuous grey lines indicate the linear trend before and 
after the introduction of regulation. Regulation takes the form of “glide paths”, in which termination charges are 
allowed to fall gradually towards a target over the period. 
 Figure 3: The Evolution of the Waterbed Effect on Prices 
 
Notes: Data from Teligen corresponding to the best deals available at every quarter. Figure 3 plots the regression 
coefficients from model (5) for twelve, non-overlapping, binary variables around the introduction of regulation and a 
final binary variable isolating the long-run effect of regulation. Hence, the base period is the time before the introduction 
of regulation, excluding the anticipation period (i.e., seven quarters before regulation backwards). The dependent 
variable is the logarithm of the PPP adjusted total bill paid by consumers with different usage at every quarter. 
Confidence interval is based on standard errors clustered (i.e.. robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of 
unknown form) at the country-operator-usage level. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: The Evolution of the Waterbed Effect on Profits 
 
 
Notes: Data from Merrill Lynch dataset. Figure 4 plots the regression coefficients from model (5a) for twelve, non-
overlapping, binary variables around the introduction of regulation and a final binary variable isolating the long-run 
effect of regulation. Hence, the base period is the time before the introduction of regulation, excluding the anticipation 
period (i.e., seven quarters before regulation backwards). The dependent variable is the logarithm of the EBITDA for 
each operator in a given country at every quarter. Confidence interval is based on standard errors clustered (i.e.. robust 
to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form) at the country-operator level. 
 
TABLE 1 – WATERBED EFFECT THROUGH MTR 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Estimation method IV IV IV IV IV IV 
Dependent variable lnPujct lnPujct lnPujct lnEBITDAjct lnEBITDAjct lnEBITDAjct 
Waterbed Effect 13.3% 4.7% 1.9% -12.5% -0.3% -1.3% 
ln(MTR)jct 
-1.207*** 
(0.411) 
-0.938*** 
(0.278) 
-0.334** 
(0.133) 
1.127* 
(0.603) 
0.070 
(0.392) 
0.620 
(0.862) 
Pre-paidjct 
-0.075 
(0.052) 
-0.067 
(0.048) 
-0.140*** 
(0.044) - - - 
Time FE yes yes yes yes yes yes 
(Usage-)County-
Operator FE yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Instrument Regulationjct 
MaxMTR 
indexjct 
UnregulatedMTR 
indexjct 
Regulationjct 
MaxMTR 
indexjct 
UnregulatedMTR 
indexjct 
1st Stage Coef. -0.110*** (0.025) 
-0.310*** 
(0.035) 
-0.382*** 
(0.028) 
-0.111*** 
(0.039) 
-0.335*** 
(0.053) 
-0.239** 
(0.105) 
1st Stage R2 0.044 0.127 0.523 0.045 0.112 0.137 
1st Stage F-test 19.75*** [0.000] 
78.85*** 
[0.000] 
188.24*** 
[0.000] 
8.20*** 
[0.006] 
40.44*** 
[0.000] 
5.19** 
[0.038] 
Observations 1734 1734 450 1135 1135 319 
Clusters 150 150 36 67 67 16 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the Teligen data corresponding to the best deals available at every quarter (columns 1-3) and the Merrill Lynch dataset (columns 4-6). 
Notes: The dependent variable in columns 1-3 is the logarithm of the PPP adjusted total bill paid by consumers with different usage at every quarter. The dependent variable 
in columns 4-6 is the logarithm of the EBITDA for each operator in a given country at every quarter. The instrumental variable “Regulation” is a binary indicator that takes 
the value one in the quarters when mobile termination rates are regulated. The instrumental variable “MaxMTR” is an index that takes larger values the more regulated a 
mobile operator is compare to the operator that is regulated the least in the same country and quarter. The instrumental variable “UnregulatedMTR” is an index that takes 
larger values the more regulated a mobile operator is compare to the operator that is unregulated in the same country and quarter. The waterbed effect in row four is calculated 
as: 1st stage coeff. × coeff. ln(MTR), when “Regulation” is used as an instrument or alternatively as: 1st stage coeff. × coeff. ln(MTR) × mean value of instrumental variable. 
P-values for diagnostic tests are in brackets and italics. Standard errors clustered (i.e. robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form) either at the country-
operator-usage level (columns 1-3) or at the country-operator level (columns 4-6) are reported in parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; 
***significant at 1%. 
 
TABLE 2 – WATERBED EFFECT THROUGH MTR (Robustness) 
         
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Estimation method IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV 
Dependent variable lnPujct lnPujct lnPujct lnPujct lnEBITDAjct lnEBITDAjct lnEBITDAjct lnEBITDAjct 
Waterbed Effect 14.2% 6.7% 15.2% 5.1% -14.8% -0.2% -13.8% -0.6% 
ln(MTR)jct 
-1.334** 
(0.525) 
-0.988** 
(0.302) 
-1.529*** 
(0.496) 
-1.076*** 
(0.283) 
1.137* 
(0.581) 
0.035 
(0.354) 
1.415* 
(0.757) 
0.187 
(0.473) 
Pre-paidjct 
-0.073 
(0.065) 
-0.067 
(0.061) 
-0.098* 
(0.053) 
-0.082* 
(0.047) - - - - 
Region-Time FE no no yes yes no no yes yes 
Time FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
(Usage-)County-
Operator FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Instrument Regulationjct 
MaxMTR 
indexjct 
Regulationjct 
MaxMTR 
indexjct 
Regulationjct 
MaxMTR 
indexjct 
Regulationjct 
MaxMTR 
indexjct 
1st Stage Coef. -0.107*** (0.026) 
-0.311*** 
(0.037) 
-0.100*** 
(0.025) 
-0.294*** 
(0.034) 
-0.131*** 
(0.038) 
-0.376*** 
(0.052) 
-0.098** 
(0.040) 
-0.288*** 
(0.055) 
1st Stage R2 0.053 0.166 0.038 0.123 0.072 0.169 0.040 0.097 
1st Stage F-test 17.40*** [0.000] 
69.02*** 
[0.000] 
16.22*** 
[0.000] 
76.14*** 
[0.000] 
12.06*** 
[0.001] 
51.56*** 
[0.000] 
5.82** 
[0.019] 
27.38*** 
[0.000] 
Observations 1293 1293 1734 1734 858 858 1135 1135 
Clusters 114 114 150 150 50 50 67 67 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the Teligen data corresponding to the best deals available at every quarter (columns 1-4) and the Merrill Lynch dataset (columns 5-8). 
Notes: The dependent variable in columns 1-4 is the logarithm of the PPP adjusted total bill paid by consumers with different usage at every quarter. The dependent variable in columns 5-8 is 
the logarithm of the EBITDA for each operator in a given country at every quarter. The instrumental variable “Regulation” is a binary indicator that takes the value one in the quarters when 
mobile termination rates are regulated. The instrumental variable “MaxMTR” is an index that takes larger values the more regulated a mobile operator is compare to the operator that is 
regulated the least in the same country and quarter. In columns 1-2 and 5-6 we exclude the countries that were unregulated throughout our sample. Columns 3-4 and 7-8 include a full set of 
region-time dummies. All countries in the sample were divided into three macro regions: Western Europe, Eastern Europe and Rest of the World (RoW); see text for more details. The waterbed 
effect in row four is calculated as: 1st stage coeff. × coeff. ln(MTR), when “Regulation” is used as an instrument or alternatively as: 1st stage coeff. × coeff. ln(MTR) × mean value of 
instrumental variable. P-values for diagnostic tests are in brackets and italics. Standard errors clustered (i.e. robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form) either at the 
country-operator-usage level (columns 1-4) or at the country-operator level (columns 5-8) are reported in parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant 
at 1%. 
 
 
TABLE 3 – COMPETITION AND WATERBED EFFECT 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Estimation method IV IV GMM GMM GMM GMM 
Dependent variable lnPujct lnPujct lnPujct lnPujct lnPujct lnPujct 
ln(MTR)jct 
-1.580*** 
(0.587) 
-1.282** 
(0.525) 
-0.733** 
(0.285) 
-0.775*** 
(0.235) 
-0.585*** 
(0.223) 
-1.026*** 
(0.220) 
ln(competitors)ct  
-0.289* 
(0.173) 
-0.473*** 
(0.180) 
-0.522*** 
(0.178) 
-0.344** 
(0.173) 
-0.339* 
(0.188) 
ln(penetration)ct  
-0.768 
(0.483) 
-0.533 
(0.371) 
-1.785*** 
(0.563) 
-3.228*** 
(0.840) 
-3.707*** 
(0.882) 
ln(MTR)jct× ln(competitors)ct   0.093 (0.097) 
0.168* 
(0.087) 
0.098 
(0.083) 
0.117 
(0.086) 
ln(MTR)jct× ln(penetration)ct    0.168 (0.141) 
1.422*** 
(0.364) 
1.792*** 
(0.413) 
ln(competitors)ct× ln(penetration)ct    0.962** (0.441) 
2.346*** 
(0.557) 
2.527*** 
(0.587) 
ln(MTR)jct× ln(competitors)ct× ln(penetration)ct     -0.895*** (0.248) 
-1.191*** 
(0.293) 
∆lnP/∆lncompetitors  -1.282 -0.304 -0.345 -0.263 -0.176 
∆lnP/∆lnMTR  -0.289 -0.614 -0.583 -0.498 -0.914 
∆lnP/∆lnpenetration  -0.768 -0.533 -0.256 0.269 0.007 
Observations 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 
Clusters 141 141 141 141 141 141 
Sargan-Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions -  
- 
 
4.244 
[0.374] 
4.418 
[0.220] 
6.071 
[0.108] 
3.654 
[0.301] 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the combination of variables from the Merrill Lynch dataset and the Teligen data corresponding to the best deals available at every quarter. 
Notes: The dependent variable in all regressions is the logarithm of the PPP adjusted total bill paid by consumers with different usage at every quarter. All equations include country-operator-
usage and a full set of year binary indicators. The full list of instruments used together with the first stage estimates can be found in Appendix B. P-values for diagnostic tests are in brackets 
and italics. Standard errors clustered (i.e. robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form) at the country-operator-usage level are reported in parenthesis below coefficients: 
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
TABLE A1 – VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS  
Pujct 
total price paid (PPP adjusted euros/year) per usage profile 
(usage profiles: high, medium and low) 
 
MTRjct 
mobile termination rate (PPP adjusted eurocents/minute) 
 
ARPUjct 
monthly average revenue per user (PPP adjusted 
euros/month) 
 
EBITDAjct 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization 
margin (%) 
 Notes: The first variable is constructed based on the Teligen dataset, the second variable is taken from the 
Cullen International dataset and the last two variables are from the Merrill Lynch dataset. See section 4 in 
the text and Appendix A for more details. 
 
 
 
TABLE A2 – SUMMARY STATISTICS  
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
Teligen (Best Deals) 
lnPujct 1734 5.203 1.708 0.107 7.492 
ln(MTR)jct 1734 1.800 1.656 -3.246 3.573 
Regulationjct 1734 0.614 0.487 0 1 
MaxMTR indexjct 1734 0.163 0.237 0 1.127 
UnregulatedMTR indexjct 450 0.150 0.291 -0.137 1.127 
Pre-paidjct 1734 0.324 0.468 0 1 
Merill Lynch 
lnEBITDAjct 1135 -1.213 0.530 -4.605 -0.545 
ln(MTR)jct 1135 1.980 1.830 -3.246 3.934 
Regulationjct 1135 0.560 0.497 0 1 
MaxMTR indexjct 1135 0.115 0.203 0 1.127 
UnregulatedMTR indexjct 319 0.090 0.236 -0.137 1.127 
Notes: The upper panel of the above table provides summary statistics on the key variables used in Table 1 (columns 1-3) and Table 2 
(columns 1-4) based on the Teligen data corresponding to the best deals available at every quarter and the matched MTRs. The lower 
panel provides similar information for the variables used in Table 1 (columns 4-6) and Table 2 (columns 5-8) based on the Merrill 
Lynch dataset and the matched MTRs. 
 
 
 
 TABLE A3 – SUMMARY STATISTICS  
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
Teligen (Best Deals) and Merill Lynch 
lnPujct 1371 5.239 1.727 0.107 7.492 
ln(MTR)jct 1371 1.809 1.694 -3.246 3.573 
Regulationjct 1371 0.626 0.484 0 1 
ln(competitors)ct 1371 1.273 0.299 0.693 1.946 
ln(mkt penetration)ct 1371 -0.132 0.153 -0.601 0.167 
Notes: The above table provides summary statistics on the key variables used in Table 3 based on the Teligen data corresponding to 
the best deals available at every quarter, the Merrill Lynch dataset and the matched MTRs. 
 
 
 
TABLE A4 – REGULATION CHRONOLOGY 
  
Country Year 
Poland 1997Q1 
UK 1998Q1 
Belgium 1999Q2 
Austria 2000Q2 
Italy 2000Q2 
Japan 2000Q2 
Spain 2000Q2 
Norway 2001Q2 
Sweden 2001Q2 
Denmark 2001Q4 
Hungary 2002Q1 
Portugal 2003Q4 
France 2004Q2 
Australia 2005Q2 
Czech Republic 2005Q2 
Germany 2005Q2 
Slovak Republic 2005Q2 
Switzerland 2005Q4 
Ireland 2006Q2 
Luxembourg 2006Q2 
New Zealand 2006Q2 
Turkey 2006Q2 
Netherlands 2006Q3 
Greece 2006Q4 
Notes: Counties in bold are the ones experienced a change in regulation during our 
sample. In contrast, countries in italics remain unregulated, whereas the rest of the 
countries were always regulated during our sample period using the Teligen price data.  
